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Anti-takeover laws are laws designed to protect target companies from hostile activity 
by making the bidder’s attempt of acquisition more expensive and/or time consuming, 
as there are three different types anti-takeover laws. The aim of this dissertation is 
analyzing the impact of different kind of antitakeover laws (fair price laws, control 
share acquisition laws, and business combination laws) on firm R&D expenditures. In 
order to do so, this study uses data about U.S. public firms between 1970 and 2011. The 
empirical findings indicate that fair Price laws increase R&D activities because of the 
possibility of increasing the expected takeover premium for managers, whereas control 
share acquisition laws and business combination laws decrease it by reducing the 
external pressure, which is the biggest incentive for firm managers to remain 
competitive in the market. Alongside, Business Combination laws seem not to have a 
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There is a long-strand of empirical studies regarding the impact governments, policy 
makers and laws have on firm profitability and economic growth (e.g., La Pota et. Al, 
2000; Clark, 2012; US Department of State, 2012; Sellers, 2012; Luo, 2006). There are 
cases where regulation is applied to balance production activities, restrict firm’s 
pollutant emissions, to control product’s prices, or to establish the acceptable terms for 
mergers and acquisitions, like the case of anti-takeover laws.  
Such laws were created in the 60s to stimulate the existence of competitive markets so 
that small firms could survive in the market and co-exist with the big and settled 
players. These laws are supposed to make hostile takeovers harder to accomplish for the 
acquirer. Whether this legislation is beneficial or prejudicial to company’s shareholders 
has been widely debated. 
The literature is divided in two groups. Supporting de Shareholder Welfare hypothesis, 
the effect of anti-takeover protection mechanisms has a positive impact on creating 
long-term shareholder value, for instance, by reducing short-term market pressure on 
firms (Stein, 1988), which allows managers to engage in the most innovative activities 
according to company’s interests. The other group supports a Managerial Welfare 
hypothesis, which says that anti-takeover laws have a chilling effect on the investment 
market by allowing managers to relax. This reduces corporate efficiency and 
productivity (Macey, 1988) and, consequently, stock value may go down as well 
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). 
A stream of research has specifically focused on the impact anti-takeover laws have on 
innovation. Innovation is directly related with profitability. Previous research has shown 
that firms that tend to have higher values of R&D investments usually generate more 
profits than companies that do not consider R&D activities as much (Bogliacino and 
Pianta, 2010), and that firm long-term sustainability depends on innovation and R&D 
investments (Gibson and Stigson, 2004). In this respect, if the Shareholder Welfare 
hypothesis is true, we should expect that antitakeover laws increase firm R&D 
spending, whereas the opposite should occur if the Managerial Welfare hypothesis is 
instead true. Past literature presents mixed findings on this issue (Sapra, Subramanian, 
and Subramanian, 2012; Jain and Wasan, 2009). 
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However, previous literature has not considered that there are different types of 
antitakeover laws. So, with this paper, my objective is to further assess the impact on 
R&D spending of three different types of anti-takeover laws, that is, Fair Price laws, 
Control Share Acquisition laws, and Business Combination laws. In particular, 
considering the population of U.S. public companies from 1970 to 2011, I will compare 
the propensity different firms in different states have to invest on R&D activities before 
and after anti-takeover laws are enacted, arguing that the outcome is dependent on the 
type of anti-takeover law passed.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Hostile Takeovers and Anti-Takeover Defenses 
A hostile takeover occurs when the target company’s management is against the deal. In 
this case, the acquiring company negotiates directly with the target company’s 
shareholders instead of negotiating with the target company’s management board. A 
hostile takeover can be accomplished through a tender offer or a proxy fight. 
A tender offer is a bid made by a potential acquirer to all target company’s stockholders 
to tender their stock for sale at a specified price during a specified period of time, 
subject to the tendering of a minimum and maximum number of shares. The offer is 
made directly to stockholders and the management board is not necessarily contacted. 
For example, if a target corporation's stock were trading at $10 per share, an acquirer 
might offer $11.50 per share to shareholders on the condition that 51% of shareholders 
agree. 
Instead, a proxy fight occurs when an acquiring company attempts to persuade target 
company’s shareholders to use their votes and proxy votes to install a new management 
that will be more willing to accept and acquisition or merger. 
So, the main difference between a tender offer and a proxy fight lies on the fact that a 
tender offer will allow the potential acquirer to become a major stockholder of the target 
company by acquiring a certain amount of shares at a higher price than the one being 
traded in the market
1
 in a specific period of time; a proxy fight will allow the potential 
                                                          
1
 A premium is added to the current share market price 
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acquirer to change the current management board for a new one that will defend a future 
acquisition between both parties. 
The target company’s management can use several defensive strategies with the intent 
of deterring the acquisition, like the “poison pill”, the “golden parachute”, or “pac-man 
defense”. 
With the poison pill defense, the target company makes its stock less attractive to the 
acquirer. This may occur by allowing current shareholders to buy more shares at a 
discounted price or, alternatively, by allowing stockholders to buy the acquirer’s shares 
at a discounted price after the merger took place. The golden parachute defense 
mechanism offers benefits to current top executives who may lose their job if the 
company is taken. Those benefits
2
 act as a deterrent to unwanted takeovers since they 
make it very expensive for a new owner to change the corporation’s management team. 
With the pac-man defense, the target firm tries to turn the situation around by acquiring 
the other company that has made the hostile takeover attempt. 
Furthermore, firms may exploit government regulations. In particular, in US, some 
states passed anti-takeover laws from 1968 on, allowing target companies to protect 
themselves more efficiently from hostile acquisitions. 
 
2.2. History of Anti-takeover legislation in US 
When corporations first started to appear in the US, mergers and acquisitions needed the 
approval of every existing shareholder to be completed. However, already in the end of 
the 19
th
 century, this requirement proved to be a huge restriction for economic growth. 
So, legislators enacted statutes that facilitated mergers and similar transactions. They 
required only two thirds of the corporation shareholders to vote in favor of the deal, if it 
had been previously approved by the management. 
After World War II, new statutes were established that eroded the position of minority 
shareholders even further. It was thought that they had too much power on influencing 
the outcome of mergers, like the possibility of preventing beneficial mergers or 
acquisitions of a public corporation listed on the national securities exchange (NSE). 
                                                          
2
 Benefits that can go up to three million US $ 
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So, from then on, the majority
3
 of shareholders were able to approve a merger or similar 
transaction. 
Starting in the 60s, statutory provisions were being used mostly in the sequence of 
tender offers. These tender offers were usually made in two steps: first, the acquiring 
corporation obtained the majority of the target’s stock; secondly, a new board of 
directors was appointed. However, the statutory scheme did not guarantee that the 
shareholders that kept their shares for the second phase of the acquisition would receive 
a value as high as the previous shareholders. This situation induced many shareholders 
to accept the tender offer immediately. 
The “storm” of corporate takeover activity generated a wave of state and federal laws. 
Lawmakers in about 40 states started to seek for legislative protections against such 
intensity of tender offers. So, several anti-takeover laws started to be enacted, in waves. 
The first anti-takeover law enacted in the US was the “Williams Act of 1968”. It defined 
the rules of mergers and tender offers, requiring full disclosure of information on part of 
the bidder to the target company and to SEC – Securities and Exchange Commission. 
This information included the terms of the bid, the cash source and the plan’s that the 
acquiring company had for the target company after the takeover was completed. Also, 
the period of time allowed for shareholders to change their votes was exactly defined, as 
well as the minimum period of time the bidder needs to have the offer opened
4
. 
A few years after the creation of the Williams Act, the “first generation” of anti-
takeover laws started to be enacted. The main goal of this legislation was to reduce the 
amount of fraudulent processes involving tender offer processes. These “Fair Price” 
laws assured shareholders that, in the case of a two-part tender offer, the minority of 
shareholders (second part) would receive the same price for each stock owned as the 
majority did at first when the initial offered had been made. 
However, in 1982, these laws were considered unconstitutional because of extending 
beyond state jurisdiction. 
                                                          
3
 51% of existing shareholders. 
4
 Shareholders had now a defined period of time after the announcement of an attempt acquisition to 
decide if they would vote in favor if against the merger. In the same sense, the bidder had to leave the 
offer opened for a minimum period of time to allow all shareholders to evaluate the terms and 
conditions and make a conscious and fully informed choice. 
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In June 1987, on the state of Minnesota, Dayton Hudson Corporation found that Dart 
Group Corporation had acquired a meaningful amount of its common stock and was 
trying to complete a takeover without even consulting management. Dayton’s CEO 
went to Minnesota’s governor asking for legislative protection to be able to defend the 
company from the hostile takeover. Dayton’s main argument was that it would destroy 
the company internally and it would result in significant job loss in Minnesota. As a 
result, Minnesota enacted a Control Acquisition Statute which ultimately contributed a 
lot for Dart Group’s tender offer failure. 
This case was just one among many that triggered a second generation of anti-takeover 
laws: the “Control Share Acquisition” legislation. It was approved to correct for the 
problems that the first generation of laws created. Corporations acquiring more than 
20% of the stock of the target corporation were not allowed to have any voting rights. 
Finally, in 1990, a third generation of anti-takeover legislation emerged to introduce 
new ways of protection from hostile takeover activities. They were called “Business 
Combination” laws and their goal was to impose moratoriums over certain transactions 
for defined periods of time. 
 
2.2.1. Fair Price legislation 
The effect of this provision is to make acquisitions more expensive for the acquirer. 
Fair price legislation requires a bidder to pay all shareholders the highest price paid to 
any shareholder during a specified period of time before the commencement of a tender 
offer. Furthermore, they require that at least 2/3 of the shareholders vote on favor of the 
acquisition in case the board disapproves or if the bid price is not “fair”
5
. Fair price laws 
are not applied if the deal is approved by the board of directors and by a supermajority 
(95% at least) of the target's shareholders, or if the acquirer pays a fair price. 
 
2.2.2. Control Share Acquisition legislation 
The consequence of the Control Share Acquisitions laws is to prevent acquisitions if 
shareholders do not agree with the transaction.  
                                                          
5
 Calculated by adding the current share price to a defined percentage of the current share price 
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A control share acquisition is defined as an acquisition of 20% or more of the voting 
shares of the target company. If the shares owned by the potential acquirer overcome 
this threshold, the acquirer does not have any voting rights. The acquiring entity’s 
voting rights may only be restored if shareholders holding a majority of shares that are 
not “interested shares” chose to restore those voting rights. 
As an example, we have a software firm called Tyler Technologies, which intended to 
purchase 32% of another company’s stock, called HTE, from the founding shareholders 
(these shareholders had recently been dropped from their executive positions at HTE). 
Tyler’s ownership was above the minimum level of 20%, which meant (under the CSA 
legislation) that they had no controlling rights. So, they tried to arrange with HTE’s 
shareholders the restoration of the voting rights to complete the merger. However, HTE 
board of directors was not very interested in the merge with Tyler and, advised by HTE 
management, the shareholders voted against Tyler’s proposal, which prevented Tyler 
from acquiring HTE. 
 
2.2.3. Business Combination legislation 
The effect of the business combination laws is to make acquisitions more time 
consuming to the potential acquirers. 
Business Combination legislation impedes an issuing public corporation (acquiring 
firm) of undertaking business with an affiliated shareholder for a period from three to 
five years, if it passes the 20% minimum of stockholding. This legislation is directed to 
certain transactions such as mergers, dissolutions, consolidations, share exchange, and 
similar ones. These laws are present in more than half of the US states. 
 
2.3. Previous Literature on Anti-takeover laws – Managerial Welfare 
hypothesis VS. Shareholder Welfare hypothesis 
Several studies have been conducted to evaluate the impact of the enactment of anti-
takeover legislation at firm-level on various variables, such as remuneration, 
construction and destruction of plants, efficiency, management entrenchment, corporate 
disclosure, among others. In principle, hostile Takeovers may have positive or negative 
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effect on corporation’s profitability (DeAngelo and Rice 1983). In this respect, a first 
group of studies sustain the “Shareholder Welfare hypothesis”: antitakeover laws 
increase the long-term profitability of the firm. A second group of studies provide 
instead evidence in favor of the “Managerial Welfare hypothesis” (Mahoney, 
Sundaramurthy, and Mahoney, 1997), according to which antitakeover laws foster 
short-term interests of managers. 
 
2.3.1. The Shareholder Welfare hypothesis 
The “Shareholder Welfare hypothesis” says that anti-takeover laws induce managers to 
operate in a long-term perspective for the firm. When anti-takeover laws are passed, 
managers do not have short-term pressures of hostile takeovers or takeover threats to be 
concerned about. This allows managers to undertake the projects with the highest 
potential according to the firm’s interests, rather than strategizing about the mechanisms 
that must be used to prevent acquisitions. 
In other words, anti-takeover protection has a positive effect on creating long-term 
shareholder value by helping to reduce market pressure
6
 (Stein, 1988). 
There is evidence that the enactment of anti-takeover laws increases white-collar 
remuneration and decreases the amount of constructions and destructions of plants, 
which is a consequence of higher productivity and efficiency (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003). Garvey and Hanka (1999) found that anti-takeover legislation 
stimulate firms whose insider holding is less than 25% to reduce their leverage ratio and 
thus avoiding higher interest rates. Howe, Jain and Pereira (2007) find a decrease in 
cash holdings and the rate of cash savings when anti-takeover legislation is adopted, 
which means more inclination to invest in valuable projects. 
Garvey (1999) finds that firms protected by control share acquisitions laws and business 
combinations laws reduce in a significant way the use of debt financing. This reduction 
is seen as positive for the shareholders; even though debt financing allows for corporate 
tax discounts, not financing with debt will allow companies to have access to lower 
interest rates since they represent a lower risk in the market. On the contrary, firms not 
protected by these laws actually increased their debt usage. 
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2.3.2. The Managerial Welfare hypothesis 
A contrasting hypothesis called the “Managerial Welfare hypothesis” (Mahoney, 
Sundaramurthy, and Mahoney, 1997) says that anti-takeover protection allows 
entrenched managers to act on their individual interests at the odds of firm log-term 
value. When anti-takeover laws are passed, managers don’t have the pressure of 
takeover threats to deal with, which allows managers to relax and forego the most 
potentially lucrative projects (as well as the most innovative practices). Instead, 
managers invest in projects that increase their own private benefits rather than the long-
term benefits of the firm. 
For instance, Cheng, Nagar and Rajan (2005) show evidence that directors and officers 
of Forbes 500 firms reduce their stock ownership by around 12,3% after anti-takeover 
legislation is enacted; this reduction testifies that managers are less interested in the 
long-term sustainability of the company  and on firm market value.  
Macey (1988) says that anti-takeover legislation in the US wastes corporate assets, fails 
to protect shareholders’ interests, and constitutes a real threat to the American economy. 
He argues that takeovers maximize shareholder wealth and produce corporate efficiency 
by fostering lower prices and improvements in productivity. Furthermore, the author 
concludes that with the passage of anti-takeover laws, shareholders will not be able to 
capture the maximum value for their shares, and that the corporate investment market 
will be chilled. 
Fu and Liu (2007) found evidence that Anti-Takeover Provisions (ATPs) tend to make 
entrenched managers going for private benefits instead of focusing on shareholders’ 
interests. The study concluded that high ATP firms have better quality of reported 
earnings and tend to disclose private information to the market more than low ATP-
firms because they are less worried with market pressure. 
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Ryngaert and Scholten (2010) say that managers that successfully used anti-takeover 




John, Li, and Pang (2010) show that firms with high values of free cash flow (which is a 
source of agency conflicts according to Jensen (1986)) have their operating performance 
and market value reduced after the anti-takeover legislation enactment. Instead, firms 
with low levels of free cash flow do not experience any significant changes on the same 
variables. 
Juks (2008) analyzed the effects of anti-takeover legislation on workplace safety and 
concluded that plants protected by anti-takeover legislation experienced on average 11% 
more workplace safety violations. He argues that the weakening of corporate 
governance makes managers less worried with safety measures. 
Garvey (1999), building on his own previous literature, finds that legal barriers to 
hostile takeovers may increase corporate slack. 
 
2.4. The Impact of Anti-takeover Laws on Innovation 
Some studies explicitly focus on the impact of anti-takeover legislation on innovation. If 
the Managerial Welfare hypothesis is true, antitakeover laws should harm innovation, as 
well-defined innovative strategies tend to increase company profitability  (Kearney, 
2008). By contrast, if the Shareholder Welfare hypothesis is true, then antitakeover laws 
should induce managers to spend more in R&D to increase company profitability. 
The empirical literature regarding this subject presents mixed evidence. 
First, there is evidence that shows anti-takeover laws increase innovation. Ederer and 
Manso (2010) explain anti-takeover legislation may foster innovation for reasons such 
as by avoiding short-term pressure, while Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2012) 
say innovative activities will increase because anti-takeover legislation avoids short-
term loss of control. 
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 This entrenchment was fostered by the enactment of new anti-takeover laws: control share acquisition 
laws and business combination laws. 
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Chemmanur and Jiao (2012) construct an analysis that shows some Anti-takeover 
Provisions can mitigate managerial myopia by alleviating managers from short-term 
pressures, which allows them to pursue long-term value creation for shareholders. 
Pugh, Page, and Jahera (1992) and, later, Malekzadeh, McWilliams, and Sen (2005) 
find an increase in R&D expenditures; similar to the previous authors, Johnson and Rao 
(1997) find evidence of an increase in unadjusted R&D expenditures after anti-takeover 
legislation is enacted. 
Secondly, there is evidence that supports a negative effect of anti-takeover legislation 
on innovation. One reason that explains why anti-takeover laws may decrease 
innovation levels is due to the high takeover pressure imposed by the potential acquirer. 
The expected loss of control will be high and thus, frequently, providing managers with 
incentives for entrenchment (Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian, 2012). 
Meulbroek, Mitchell, Mulherin, Netter, and Poulsen (1990) find a reduction in the 
market-adjusted R&D to sale ratio; Mahoney, Sundaramurthy, and Mahoney (1997) 
find later a similar conclusion regarding the industry-adjusted R&D expenditures after 
the enactment of anti-takeover legislation. Harris and Raviv (1989, 1991) suggest that 
anti-takeover protection in corporate charters fosters management entrenchment, thus 
abdicating corporate innovation to levels below optimal, which will lower firm value. 
Atanassov (2010) studies Business Combination laws, Fair Price laws, and Control 
Share Acquisition laws to evaluate the impact they have on quantity and quality of 
innovation, concluding that firms based in states protected by anti-takeover legislation 
have a smaller number of significant innovations. 
Thirdly, there are also studies that show evidence that anti-takeover legislation acts in 
both ways and may increase and decrease innovation, or that it does not have any 
significant impact at all. 
Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2012) argue that there’s a U-shaped relationship 
between the degree of innovation and takeover pressure. When the takeover pressure is 
very low managers choose to innovate more because the expected loss of control 
benefits is minimal; when the takeover pressure is high, both expected takeover 
premium and expected loss of control are high, but the expected takeover premium 
effect dominates and managers will choose to innovate more. Managers will only act on 
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their personal interests when takeover pressure levels are medium. Furthermore, the 
authors also defend that innovation levels increase with monitoring intensity since 
manager’s private benefits will decrease in accordance. 
Jain and Wasan (2009) find no evidence of significant changes on firm-level R&D 
expenditures after the passage of anti-takeover legislation (at a state level). The authors 
also consider that the previous literature on R&D expenditures had very dispersed and 
inconclusive results because of unobservable variables correlated with anti-takeover 
protection and R&D expenditures at the same time - reverse causality. 
However, previous studies have considered the different antitakeover laws as perfect 
substitutes. Instead, as explained in the previous sections, the mechanisms through 
which they hamper hostile takeovers are quite different. Hence, also the outcome likely 
differs. In this study, I propose to evaluate the impact of FP laws, CSA laws, and BC 
laws on R&D investments. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Sample and data 
To investigate the impact of Fair Price, Control Share Acquisition and Business 
Combination laws on R&D expenditures, I used the Compustat financial database that 
includes 133.560 observations from U.S. publicly traded firms. The database range is 
from 1970 to 2011. The first anti-takeover laws started to be implemented in the United 
States in the beginning of the 80s; so, a database with this range allows me to have a 
comparable set of results on the effects and impact these laws had on the variables I 
study, since I can compare the course of action before the laws took place and after they 
were enacted. 
I create three variables corresponding to the year when anti-takeover laws were enacted 
in the respective states. Those variables are Fair Price laws (FPANTITK), Control Share 
Acquisition laws (CSAANTITK), and Business Combination laws (BCANTITK). To 
find out when those laws were passed and in which states, the source was Atanassov 
(2010) and his work “Do hostile takeovers stifle innovation?”. 
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In conclusion, I exclude observations of companies that do not have available 
information for R&D expenditures, assets’ value, or number of employees. Therefore, 
the sample is, in the end, represented by 133.560 observations of 14.059 U.S. public 
corporations between 1970 and 2011. 
 
3.2. Measures 
After explaining the sample characteristics used in the analysis, I will now explain the 
variable construction process to assess the relation between anti-takeover legislation and 
firms’ R&D expenditures. The following table (Table 1) shows all the variables that 
were used in the empirical analysis. 
Table 1. Variables and Definition 
Variable name Description Source 
R&D 
expenditures 






Assumes value 1 if in a determined year and state this kind of law 
was enacted, 0 otherwise 
Atanassov, 2010 
Fair Price laws 
Assumes value 1 if in a determined year and state this kind of law 




Assumes value 1 if in a determined year and state this kind of law 
was enacted, 0 otherwise 
Atanassov, 2010 
Assets Measured in Millions of US $ Compustat 
Employees Number of employees measured in thousands of people Compustat 
                                                          
9 Compustat is a database of financial, statistical and market information on active and inactive global companies throughout the 
world. Provides a broad range of information products directed at institutional investors, universities, bankers, advisors, analysts, 
and asset/portfolio managers in corporate, M&A, private capital, equity, and fixed income markets. The database covers 99,000 
global securities, covering 99% of the world's total market capitalization with annual company data history available back to 1950. 
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3.2. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of this study is R&D expenditures. As explained before, the 
novelty on this work is that I evaluate the impact on anti-takeover laws individually, 
instead of assessing their impact as a whole as previous research has done. 
 
3.3. Independent Variables: Anti-takeover Laws 
Understanding whether anti-takeover laws are an exogenous or endogenous is a difficult 
subject to discuss. One of two things can occur: 
First, it is possible that anti-takeover laws are hardly influenced or predicted by 
individuals or companies. The decisions regarding changes in anti-takeover legislation 
are taken in Supreme Courts of each state. Thus, assuming the market is are efficient, 
the variable anti-takeover legislation is exogenous because companies are not aware of 
the enactment of the laws until the moment it is announced. 
However, on the other hand, it is possible that companies and individual can anticipate 
the enactment of anti-takeover laws. For example, in Texas, some companies started to 
complain about the lack of protection they had against hostile acquirers. The debate 
spread and courts also started to address the issue. At this point, companies could 
almost assume that some legislation was going to be passed because of such high levels 
of controversy. Therefore, in this case, one can say that companies actually had some 
power on influencing regulators to take action; so, the impact can be considered 
endogenous. If managers could expect the change in regulation, they would be able to 
implement the necessary changes in its practices before the law would be approved.  
However, overall previous research has concluded that the change can be considered as 
exogenous (Atanassov, 2010; Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian, 2012; Jain and 





3.3.1. Fair Price laws (FPANTITK) 
To assess the impact of the Fair Price regulation, the variable FPANTITK assumes the 
value 1 if the state of the firm’s headquarters in a given year has already enacted the 
law, and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.3.2. Control Share Acquisition laws (CSAANTITK) 
To assess the impact of the Fair Price regulation, the variable CSAANTITK assumes 
the value 1 if the state of the firm’s headquarters in a given year has already enacted the 
law, and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.3.3. Business Combination laws (BCANTITK) 
To assess the impact of the Fair Price regulation, the variable BCANTITK assumes the 
value 1 if the state of the firm’s headquarters in a given year has already enacted the 
law, and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.4. Control Variables 
It is very likely that the variables R&D expenditures, assets’ value, and number of 
employees are correlated, since the bigger the company is, the higher the R&D 
investments in rough values tend to be, the more employees they have, and the higher 
the assets’ value should be. 
A few control variables were introduced in the analysis in order to reduce the risk of 
over or underestimation. The first variable, number of employees, was introduced with 
the goal of controlling the effect that big companies have in R&D expenditures since 
the bigger companies are, the bigger R&D investments tend to be in absolute value. The 
second control variable introduced was assets owned by firms (in value) with the intent 




3.5. Empirical Strategy 
To proceed with the analysis of the impact that anti-takeover legislation has on R&D 
investments, I used difference-in-differences technique. The diverse states adopted the 
respective legislation in different years, so I used the procedure of Acharya et al. (2010) 
using panel estimation to implement differences in differences in a setting of multiple 
treatment groups over multiple years. Hence, I estimated the following regression 
through OLS: 
xrdist = α FPANTITKst + µ CSAANTITKst + β BCANTITKst + δ log atit + θ log empit + 
λ log xrdit + Ɛ ist 
In the equation, xrdist represents the R&D expenditures for company i in the year t and 
state s, and Ɛist is the idiosyncratic error for company i in state s in year t. FPANTITKst 
=1 for year t in which Fair Price legislation was enacted in state s, and zero otherwise; 
CSAANTITKst =1 for year t in which Control Share Acquisition legislation was enacted 
in state s; BCANTITKst =1 for year t in which Business Combination legislation was 
enacted in state s. atit is the assets’ value of company i in year t and empit is the number 
of employees in company i and year t. 
However, this difference-in-differences analysis may create one problem: the standards 
errors’ value resulting from correlations may be very high if the estimation includes 
various periods of time. To control for this, I clustered the errors to the state level as the 
strategy of Bertrand et al (2004) implies. 










Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables, whereas Table 3 presents the 
pairwise correlation among them. 











FPANTITK 133.560 0,3076 0,4618 0,0000 1 
CSAANTITK 133.560 0,1950 0,3962 0,0000 1 
BCANTITK 133.560 0,3439 0,4750 0,0000 1 
Assets’ value 133.560 3.920,12 47.014,01 0,0000 3.771.200 
Number of employees10 133.560 6,6412 30,4909 0,0000 2.545,209 
R&D expenditures11 133.560 50,3773 351,4758 0,0000 12.183 
 













R&D exp. 1,000      
FPANTITK 0,0084 1,000     
CSAANTITK -0,0194 0,2998 1,000    
BCANTITK 0,0029 0,7636 0,5350 1,000   
Assets’ value 0,5858 0,0038 -0,0140 -0,0051 1,000  
# employees 0,4602 0,0116 0,0106 -0,0055 0,5409 1,000 
 
Table 4 presents the results obtained by regressing R&D with all anti-takeover laws, 
together and separately.  
Results in Table 4, column 1, show that, in a determined state, if a Fair Price law is 
passed, R&D expenditures increase 16, 97 (±4, 741) Million US $ relatively to what 
R&D expenditures used to be before such enactment. On the other hand, Control Share 
Acquisition laws impact negatively R&D investments because after the enactment of 




 *10^3 € 
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such a law, its value goes down 56, 98 (±4, 259) Million US $. The Business 
Combination legislation is negatively related with anti-takeover legislation enactment as 
well; R&D expenditures feel an average impact of 9, 049 (±4, 788) Million US $ when 
Business Combination legislation is adopted. 
Columns 2, 3 and 4 show the results of running the variable R&D expenditures alone 
with all the independent variables. The results were still consistent with the previous 
column where all the variables are run together. 
The passage of a Fair Price anti-takeover law in a determined state has, on average, a 
positive impact of 2, 583 (±3, 739) Million US $ on R&D investments. However, the 
relation between R&D activities and the enactment of Control Share Acquisition laws is 
negative in 57, 46 (±3, 997) Million US $. The Business Combination legislation impact 
on R&D is also consistent with the results when all the variables are run together, and is 
negative in 16, 45 (±3, 599) Million US $ when such a law is enacted. 
 
Table 4. Impact of anti-takeover legislation on R&D expenditures as a whole (1) 
and individual impact of FP laws (2), CSA laws (3) and BC laws (4) on R&D 
expenditures 
VARIABLES (1) 
R&D exp. on 
AT laws 
(2) 
R&D exp. on FP 
laws alone 
(3) 
R&D exp. on CSA 
laws alone 
(4) 









































Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
In more detail, I will explain the reasons for the contrasting effects between Fair Price 
laws and Control Share Acquisition laws regarding R&D activities. 
The Fair Price legislation greatly increases investments in R&D because this law makes 
a takeover more expensive. Typically, shareholders want their managers to own stock 
options of the company so that their interests are aligned so that managers have the 
incentive to increase firm value. With this legislation, managers can have some control 
regarding the expected takeover premium
12
, which will increase proportionally with the 
firm market value.  
On the other hand, Control Share Acquisition laws and Business Combination laws o 
have a negative impact on R&D investments, as they simply make the acquisition more 
difficult or time consuming, but not more expensive. Hence, with the enactment of these 
laws, the external market pressure is much reduced. The market pressure is what 
incentives managers to spend money in profitable activities for the company: to remain 
competitive in the market, to try not to be acquired and to keep their jobs, managers are 
forced to increase company share value. Consistent with the Managerial Welfare 
Hypothesis, with anti-takeover legislation managers will not have to be concerned about 
this feature and will most likely remain focused on wasting money on activities that are 
not the optimal for the company’s interests. 
 
                                                          
12
 The takeover premium for managers is set as a percentage of the value of each stock owned by them 










Observations 133.560 133.560 133.560 133.560 
# of firms 14.059 14.059 14.059 14.059 
R-squared 0,067 0,066 0,067 0,066 
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4.1. Robustness Checks 
Small effects can show up as statistically significant in a large sample size. To address 
this problem, which rises from the difference-in-differences analysis, I repeat the 
analysis two times more using different criteria to authenticate the results of this study. 
So, at first, I use a shorter period of analysis to conduct the analysis. From the initial 
sample of 1970 to 2011, I reduce it to only cover the years from 1980 to 1991. I limit 
the analysis to the period since when the first anti-takeover law was enacted until the 
last one was implemented. The main reason for this reduction is to decrease the number 
of overall observations, and to take into account the exact time period where most 
changes in antitakeover laws actually occur. I find that the new evidence supports the 
one from the previous analysis: fair price laws increase R&D expenditures while control 
share acquisition laws and business combination laws decrease R&D investments. 
However, the sample reduction caused a loss in the significance value of some variables 
from p<0,01 to p<0,05. Still, the F-Test had a p<0.001 which shows great coherence to 
the model. In this modified sample, the number of observations accounts for 34,182 of 
5,976 publically traded U.S. companies. Results can be seen in table 5, and are 
consistent with the results of the previous models, where I find that fair price laws 
increase R&D investments and control share acquisitions and business combination 
laws decrease R&D expenditures. 
 
Table 5. Impact of anti-takeover legislation on R&D expenditures as a whole (1) 
and individual impact of FP laws (2), CSA laws (3) and BC laws (4) on R&D 
expenditures, in the period of 1980 to 1991. 
VARIABLES (1) 
R&D exp. on AT 
laws 
(2) 
R&D exp. on FP 
laws alone 
(3) 
R&D exp. on 
CSA laws alone 
(4) 

















Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the second modified analysis, I take into account only the “really innovative” 
companies, that is, companies that in a particular year have produced at least one 
patented invention. In order to do so, I merge the already presented Compustat database 
with the patent database from NBER
13
 (National Bureau of Economic Research). 
The findings show the consistency with previous results; fair price laws still increase 
R&D expenditures while control share acquisition laws and business combination laws 
go on the opposite direction and tend to decrease, on average, R&D investments. 
However, the sample reduction caused a loss in the significance value of some variables 
from p<0,01 to p<0,05, although the F-Test had a p<0.001 which shows great coherence 
to the model. In this modified sample, the number of observations accounts for 28,841 




                                                          
13
 NBER is a research organization is an American private nonprofit organization devoted to provide 
unbiased economic research among public policymakers, business professionals, and academic 
community. The database used in this study includes information regarding filed patents, received 


































Observations 34.182 34.182 34.182 34.182 
# of firms 5.976 5.976 5.976 5.976 
R-squared 0,035 0,035 0,035 0,035 
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Table 6. Impact of anti-takeover legislation on R&D expenditures as a whole (1) 
and individual impact of FP laws (2), CSA laws (3) and BC laws (4) on R&D 
expenditures, regarding the most innovative companies. 
Standard errors in parentheses 







R&D exp. on AT 
laws 
(2) 
R&D exp. on FP 
laws alone 
(3) 
R&D exp. on 
CSA laws alone 
(4) 
















































Observations 28.841 28.841 28.841 28.841 
# of firms 4.603 4.603 4.603 4.603 
R-squared 0,139 0,138 0,138 0,138 
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
With this study I assess the impact anti-takeover laws have on innovative investments, 
more specifically, research and development expenditures. It shows that firm’s R&D 
expenditures variations depend on the anti-takeover law enacted, and the results are not 
always positive. Different laws stimulate R&D activities differently. 
The findings show evidence to support both MWH and SWH: fair price laws encourage 
innovation while control share acquisition laws and business combination laws tend to 
incentive managers to reduce R&D investments and become more entrenched. 
In more detail, fair price laws make the acquisition more expensive, providing 
companies with the only defensive mechanism that fosters innovation. By owning 
company stock, managers also have interest in making the firm more valuable. If they 
are able to increase firm value, the expected takeover premium will be higher, even if 
the probability of takeover decreases.  
Instead control share acquisition laws turn takeovers into a more difficult and time 
consuming process. This law reduces the external pressure, which is supposed to force 
managers to work on maintaining the company competitive in the market (by spending 
money in activities that are profitable and healthy for the company). By providing 
managers with mechanisms that mitigate hostile takeover pressure, they feel better 
protected and do not have to be concerned with having their position threatened. Thus, 
in line with the Managerial Welfare Hypothesis, managers tend to decrease investments 
in R&D activities. 
Business combination laws only make the acquisition more time consuming (and not 
more expensive, as the control share acquisition legislation). The merger or acquisition 
is possible to be concluded after the moratorium period, so it can be considered to 
provide managers with a weaker defense relatively to CSA laws. So, in line with the 
Managerial Welfare Hypothesis, managers reduce R&D investments and focus instead 
on their own private benefits, and invest in projects with quicker and guaranteed returns 
but also less valuable. 
These findings are significant for both companies and policy-makers. On one side, 
companies that operate in highly technologically advanced and competitive markets, 
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where innovation plays a key role on long-term sustainability, might obtain better long-
term results if settled in a state where fair price laws are enacted. On the other side, 
policy makers can also benefit from understanding this piece of literature. Depending on 
what they believe it is best or it is needed to a specific region (and companies or 
businesses that operate in the state), policy makers might make their decisions based on 
more available information. For example, if they believe that innovation is critical to 
foster the economy, they may choose to enact fair price laws. On the contrary, if they 
believe that intense competition and innovation may be destroying companies in an 
unhealthy way, they may choose to enact control share acquisition laws or business 
combination laws, conferring a reduced emphasis to R&D investments. 
An area that remains interesting for further research is checking the propensity for 
companies to invest in firms that belong to states protected by different types of 
antitakeover laws. It could be possible to argue that this propensity might change 
according to the kind of law that is established in that same state, and I leave this as a 
















This table reports the year, in which Fair Price (FP), Control Share Acquisition (CSA), and Business Combination (BC) 
laws were passed in different states. Fair Price laws require shareholders acquiring a percentage of stocks beyond a 
threshold level to pay a “fair price" for all stocks acquired; Control Share Acquisition laws give the right to non-
interested shareholders to decide whether a large shareholder has voting rights; Business Combination laws impose 
a moratorium (three to five years) on specified transactions between the target and the acquirer holding a specified 
threshold percentage of stock unless the board votes otherwise before the acquiring person becomes an interested 
shareholder. Source: Atanassov 2010 
State Year FP Passed Year CSA passed Year BC Passed 
Arizona 1987 1987 1987 
Connecticut 1984 - 1989 
Delaware - - 1988 
Hawaii - 1985 - 
Georgia 1985 - 1988 
Idaho 1988 1988 1988 
Illinois 1984 - 1989 
Indiana 1986 1986 1986 
Kansas 1989 1988 1989 
Kentucky 1989 - 1987 
Louisiana 1985 1987 - 
Maine - - 1988 
Maryland 1983 1988 1989 
Massachusetts - 1987 1989 
Michigan 1985 1988 1989 
Minnesota - 1984 1987 
Mississippi 1985 1991 - 
Missouri 1986 1984 1986 
Nebraska - 1988 1988 
Nevada - 1987 1991 
New Jersey 1986 - 1986 
New York 1985 - 1985 
North Carolina 1987 1987 - 
Oklahoma - 1987 1991 
Ohio 1990 - 1990 
Oregon - 1987 - 
Pennsylvania 1989 1989 1989 
Rhode Island - - 1990 
South Carolina 1988 1988 1988 
South Dakota 1990 1990 1990 
Tennessee 1988 1988 1988 
Utah - 1987 - 
Virginia 1985 1988 1988 
Washington 1990 - 1987 
Wisconsin 1985 1991 1987 
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